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We show that, in the case of a vertical technology transfer, if there is imperfect knowledge spillover 
under a weak patent protection, the strong patent protection in the developing country increases the 
profit of the developed-country firm if there is a uniform tax rate in the developing country. If there is 
either perfect knowledge spillover under weak patent protection or the developing country charges 
discriminatory tax rates, the profits of the developed-country firms are the same under weak and strong 




JEL classification: F23, L13, H25, O34 
 









2. The model and the results 
2.1. Uniform tax policy 
  2.1.1. Strong patent protection in country 2 
  2.1.2. Weak patent protection in country 2 
  2.2. Discriminatory tax policy 
  2.2.1. Strong patent protection in country 2 
  2.2.2. Weak patent protection in country 2 
3. Conclusion Non-Technical Summary  
An important suggestion of the WTO is to strengthen patent protection in the developing countries in order 
to give the developed-country firms proper returns from their innovations. However, the existing literature 
shows that a strong patent protection in the developing countries may reduce the profits of the developed-
country firms under a vertical technology transfer. We show that this result does not hold in the presence 
of government intervention. 
We show that, under a vertical technology transfer, if there is imperfect knowledge spillover under a weak 
patent protection, the strong patent protection in the developing country increases the profit of the 
developed-country firm if there is a uniform tax rate in the developing country. If there is either perfect 
knowledge spillover under weak patent protection or the developing country charges discriminatory tax 
rates, the profits of the developed-country firms are the same under weak and strong patent protections in 
the developing countries.   1
1. Introduction 
Under the current WTO (World Trade Organization) regime, an important issue is the 
standardization (and strengthening) of patent systems across countries, and it has 
gathered momentum due to the Dunkel proposal in connection with Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). An important aspect of this standardization 
process is to strengthen patent protection in the developing countries. It is often be the 
case that a weak patent protection in the developing country allows the developing-
country firms to compete with the developed-country firms after imitating the 
technologies of the latter firms. Thus, a weak patent protection in the developing 
country may reduce innovation in the developed country by reducing the return of the 
innovator in the developed-country. 
  It follows from Pack and Saggi (2001) that the above view may not be correct 
if there is a vertical technology transfer.
1 Their analysis suggests that knowledge 
spillover in the developing countries
2 may actually increase the profits of the 
developed-country firms, which outsource production to the developing countries. 
Hence, as an important implication of their work, a strong patent protection in the 
developing countries may actually reduce the profits and innovation in the developed 
                                                 
1 A large body of empirical evidence shows that vertical knowledge transfer occurs as firms from 
industrialized countries have bought outputs of firms from Asian newly industrialized countries 
(Hobday, 1995). As mentioned in Pack and Saggi (2001), Radio Shack and Texas Instruments have 
commissioned firms from newly industrialized countries to produce components or entire products, 
which have been sold under the name of the retailers. The results of extensive interviews in Korea in 
the late 1970s show that almost half of the firms in the sample benefitted from the technical 
information provided by the foreign buyers (Rhee et al., 1984). Keesing (1982) found that, in Korea 
and Taiwan in the late 1970s, importers maintained a very large staffs based in the countries which 
spent considerable time with their local manufacturers. Hou and Gee (1993) also confirm significant 
technology transfer by developed country importers to the producers from newly industrialized 
countries. 
2 The presence of weak property rights in several Asian countries along with the type of knowledge 
transferred made it difficult to prevent knowledge spillover in the producing countries. As documented 
in Becker (1964), the training provided by the developed country firms are highly transferable to other 
firms. 
   2
countries in the presence of vertical technology transfer, thus contradicting the view 
of WTO. 
  We develop a simple model of international outsourcing with an active 
developing-country government, which imposes per-unit tax on the developing-
country firms, to revisit this issue. We consider two situations: (i) where the outputs 
are not sold in the developing country (which is the producing country), and (ii) 
where the outputs are sold entirely in the developing country. In each of these 
situations, we consider uniform and discriminatory taxes imposed by the developing 
country. Though discriminatory tax rates provide the government distributional 
flexibility, the uniform tax rates are simpler and easier to implement. As mentioned in 
Coşgel (2006, pp. 333) “The cost of administering a system with discriminatory rates 
can be very high when the characteristics of tax payers do not differ systematically or 
when these differences cannot be easily observed. It is generally easier to identify 
differences between the sectors of the economy than within each sector, making it 
harder to implement discriminatory rates within a sector.”
3   
In this framework, we show that if the knowledge spillover under weak patent 
protection is imperfect, the strong patent protection, which eliminates knowledge 
spillover in the developing country, makes the developed-country firm (which is 
outsourcing its production to the developing country) better off under a uniform tax 
policy. If there is either perfect knowledge spillover under weak patent protection or 
the developing country imposes discriminatory tax rates, the profit of the developed-
country firm is the same under weak and strong patent protections. Thus, our result 
suggests that, in the presence of an active developing-country government, a strong 
                                                 
3 Davidson et al. (2005) show that even if an economy sets a uniform tax rate, the effective taxation 
may be closer to an optimal discriminatory tax system if the firms self-select into a black market.   3
patent policy in the developing country may be required to encourage vertical 
technology transfer. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
model and shows the results. Section 3 concludes. 
 
2. The model and the results 
We adopt the model from Pack and Saggi (2001). Assume that there are three firms: 
firm 1 from a developed country (called country 1), firm 2, which is an incumbent 
producer in a developing country (called country 2) and firm 3, which is a potential 
producer in the developing country. The profit firm 1 can earn by producing in 
country 1 is normalized to zero. We assume that firm 1 transfers its technology to 
firm 2, which produces the output at the marginal cost 1 c , which is assumed to be zero 
for simplicity. However, if there is a weak patent protection in country 2, technology 
transfer to firm 2 may create knowledge spillover, which allows firm 3 to compete 
with firm 2 at the constant marginal cost  0 ≥ c . If  0 > c , knowledge spillover in the 
developing country is imperfect. Technical complexity may affect the benefit from 
knowledge spillover, thus affecting the value of c. Though firm 1 loses control over 
its technology due to knowledge spillover in country 2 under a weak patent 
protection, we assume that firms 2 and 3 do not have enough marketing skills to sell 
the product. Hence, firm 1 does not face any threat of competition in the product 
market from firms 2 and 3. We assume that there is no knowledge spillover under a 
strong patent protection in country 2. Hence, there is no production of firm 3 under a 
strong patent protection in country 2. 
  We consider the following game. At stage 1, firm 1 transfers its technology to 
firm 2.  However, if there is a weak patent protection in country 2, knowledge about   4
firm 1’s technology diffuses to firm 3, while firm 2 remains the sole producer of the 
product under a strong patent protection in country 2. At stage 2, the government of 
country 2 imposes per-unit output tax on the producers in country 2. At stage 3, firm 2 
chooses its output if there is no knowledge spillover in country 2, and the output is 
sold to firm 1 at the per-unit price w, which is determined from the demand faced by 
firm 2. However, in the presence of knowledge spillover, at stage 3, both firms 2 and 
3 produce the outputs like Cournot duopolists, and the outputs are sold to firm 1 at the 
per-unit price w, which is determined from the total demand faced by firms 2 and 3. 
At stage 4, firm 1 determines its output and the profits are realized. We solve the 
game through backward induction. 
  Assume that the market demand function is 
  q a P − = ,           ( 1 )  
where P  is the price and q is the output, and  c a > . 
 
2.1. Uniform tax policy 
Let us first consider the situation where the government of country 2 imposes a 
uniform tax rate, t. Given w, firm 1 maximizes the following expression to 
determine its output: 
  q w q a Max
q
) ( − − .          ( 2 )  








= ,           ( 3 )  
The second order condition for maximization is satisfied. Equation (3) creates the 
inverse derived demand curve  I q a w 2 − =   for the firms in country 2. 
   5
2.1.1. Strong patent protection in country 2 
Let us first consider the situation of a strong patent protection, i.e., of no knowledge 
spillover, in country 2. In this situation, only firm 2 produces in country 2. Firm 2 
produces its output to maximize the following expression: 




q t q a Max
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= .           ( 5 )  
The second order condition for maximization is satisfied. 
  If the products of firm 1 are not sold in country 2, welfare of country 2 is 
2 2 2 2 ) ( I I I wq tq q t w W = + − = . Government of country 2 determines t to maximize 








.         ( 6 )  
The equilibrium tax rate is 
  0
* = t .            ( 7 )  
The second order condition for maximization is satisfied. 
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firm 1 is 
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  Let us now consider the situation where all the outputs of firm 1 are sold in 
















tq q t w W + = + + − = . Government of country 2 determines t to 
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2.1.2. Weak patent protection in country 2 
Now consider the case of a weak patent protection, which creates knowledge 
spillover, in country 2. In this situation, both firms 2 and 3 produce in country 2. Total 
demand faced by firms 2 and 3 is  I q a w 2 − = . 
  Firms 2 and 3 produce their outputs to maximize the following expressions 
respectively: 
  2 3 2 ) 2 2 (
2
I I I q
q t q q a Max
I
− − −                     (12a) 




q c t q q a Max
I
− − − − .                  (12b) 
















= .                      (13b) 
The second order conditions for maximization are satisfied.  
  If the products of firm 1 are not sold in country 2, welfare of country 2 is 
3 3 2 2 ) ( ) ( I I I I I cq wq tq q c t w q t w W − = + − − + − = , where  3 2 I I I q q q + = , and the 
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The equilibrium tax rate is 
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2 * c a
t
−
= .                          (15) 
The second order condition for maximization is satisfied. 
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2a
c < , which ensures positive output of firm 2. 
The price paid by firm 1 is 
4
2 * c a
w
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= π .                        (16) 
  Let us now consider the situation where all the outputs of firm 1 are sold in 
country 2. In this situation, welfare of country 2 is 
2 2












tq q c t w q t w W + − = + + − − + − = . The government of 
country 2 determines t to maximize the following expression:   8
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The equilibrium tax rate is 
 0
* = t .                                     (18) 
The second order condition for maximization is satisfied. 
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c < , which ensures positive output of firm 2. 
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Proposition 1: Consider a uniform tax policy in the developing country (i.e., country 
2). 
(i) If all the outputs of firm 1 are sold outside country 2, a weak patent protection in 
country 2 reduces the profit of firm 1 for  0 > c . 
(ii) If all the outputs of firm 1 are sold in country 2, a weak patent protection in 
country 2 reduces the profit of firm 1 for  0 > c . 
Proof: (i) The comparison of (8) and (16) shows that (8) > (16) for any  0 > c . 
(ii) The comparison of (11) and (19) shows that (11) > (19) for any  0 > c .       Q.E.D. 
 
  Proposition 1 shows that if the government of country 2 plays an active role 
and imposes output-tax on the producers in country 2, knowledge spillover under   9
vertical technology transfer reduces the profit of the developed-country firm, thus 
contrasting Pack and Saggi (2001). It follows from the above analysis that knowledge 
spillover does not affect the profit of the developed-country firm if  0 = c , i.e., if 
knowledge spillover is perfect. 
  The reason for the above result is as follows. Weak patent protection 
(compared to strong patent protection) increases the tax rate in country 2. If the 
outputs of firm 1 are not sold in country 2, the government of country 2 sets the tax 
rate to maximize the total profits of the firms in country 2. Since competition under 
weak patent protection tends to increase output and reduce the total profits of the 
firms in country 2, it increases the incentive to increase the tax rate compared to a 
strong patent protection, where firm 2 becomes the monopoly producer in country 2. 
If the outputs of firm 1 are sold entirely in country 2, the government of country 2 
cares about both the profits of the firms in country 2 and consumer surplus. Since 
weak patent protection increases competition in country 2, which helps to reduce the 
total profits of the firms in country 2 but to increase consumer surplus, it increases the 
incentive for higher tax (or lower subsidy as evident from (10) and (18)) compared to 
a strong patent protection in country 2. Hence, on one hand, given the tax rate, weak 
patent protection tends to reduce the price paid by firm 1. On the other hand, weak 
patent protection increases the tax rate compared to a strong patent protection, which, 
in turn, tends to increase the price paid by firm 1. On the balance, the price paid by 
firm 1 is higher under weak patent protection, thus reducing its profit under weak 
patent protection compared to a strong patent protection. 
  It is worth mentioning that, due to the asymmetry between firms 2 and 3, one 
may think that the welfare maximizing government of country 2 may prefer to set the 
tax rate in a way so that only firm 2 (i.e., the cost efficient producer) produces.   10
However, it is easy to check that this is not the case, and the government of country 2 
prefers to set the uniform tax rate in a way so that both firms 2 and 3 produce. 
 
2.2. Discriminatory tax policy 
Let us now consider the case where the government of country 2 imposes 
discriminatory taxes  2 t  and  3 t  to firms 2 and 3 respectively. Given w, firm 1 
maximizes (2) and the equilibrium output is given by (3), which gives the inverse 
derived demand curve  I q a w 2 − =   for the firms in country 2. 
 
2.2.1. Strong patent protection in country 2 
If there is no knowledge spillover, the analysis is similar to subsection 2.1.1. If the 
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= π , which is shown in (11). 
 
2.2.2. Weak patent protection in country 2 
Now consider the case of a weak patent protection in country 2. In this situation, both 
firms 2 and 3 produce in country 2. It follows from (3) that the demand function faced 
by the firms in country 2 is  I q a w 2 − =  . Therefore, firms 2 and 3 produce their 
outputs to maximize the following expressions respectively: 




q t q q a Max
I
− − −                    (20a) 




q c t q q a Max
I
− − − − .                  (20b) 
The equilibrium outputs of firms 2 and 3 are respectively   11
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The second order conditions for maximization are satisfied.  
  If the products of firm 1 are not sold in country 2, welfare of country 2 is 
3 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 ) ( ) ( I I I I I I cq wq q t q t q c t w q t w W − = + + − − + − = , and the government of 
country 2 determines t to maximize the following expression: 
 
6
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.             (22) 
The optimal tax rates are 




2 = − + + − c a t t                     (23a) 




2 = + + + − c a t t .                    (23b) 
Both (23a) and (23b) cannot hold simultaneously, which implies that either  2 t  or  3 t  
does not have an interior equilibrium value. 
If the tax rates satisfy (23a), welfare of country 2 is   
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W
− − − −
= .                    (24) 
However, if the tax rates satisfy (23b), welfare of country 2 is 
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t a c c a
W
− − −
= .                    (25) 
Comparison of (24) and (25) shows that (24) is greater than (25). Hence, welfare of 
country 2 is maximized if the equilibrium tax rates satisfy (23a). If the tax rates 
satisfy (23a), we get from (23b) that welfare of country 2 changes positively with 
respect to  3 t . Hence, the tax rate 
*
3 t  will be as high as possible. However, a higher 
*
3 t    12
may make production unprofitable for firm 3. For a given 
*









> , we 
get 0
*
3 = I q , and only firm 2 produces in country 2. 
The above discussion suggests that, under discriminatory tax rates, welfare of 
country 2 under a weak patent protection is maximized if firm 3 does not produce 
positive outputs. However, it should be noted that, if  0
*
3 = I q  and the outputs are not 
sold in country 2, welfare of country 2 would not be 
3 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 ) ( ) ( I I I I I I cq wq q t q t q c t w q t w W − = + + − − + − = , but it would be 




qI = . Hence, under 
discriminatory tax rates, if the outputs are not sold in country 2, welfare of country 2 




qI =  and  0
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3 = I q . Therefore, the equilibrium tax rates are  0
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= π , 
which is equal to the profit of firm 1 under the strong patent protection. 
  Let us now consider the situation where all the outputs of firm 1 are sold in 
country 2. In this situation, welfare of country 2 is 
2 2
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The optimal tax rates are   13




2 = − + − c t t                               (27a) 




2 = + + − c t t .                                (27b) 
Both (27a) and (27b) cannot hold simultaneously, which implies that either  2 t  or  3 t  
does not have an interior equilibrium value. 
If the tax rates satisfy (27a), welfare of country 2 is   
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However, if the tax rates satisfy (23b), welfare of country 2 is  
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= .              (29) 
Comparison of (28) and (29) shows that (28) is greater than (29). Hence, welfare of 
country 2 is maximized if the equilibrium tax rates satisfy (27a). If the tax rates 
satisfy (27a), we get from (27b) that welfare of country 2 changes positively with 
respect to  3 t . Hence, the tax rate 
*
3 t  will be as high as possible. However, given 
*









> , we get  0
*
3 = I q , and only firm 2 produces in country 2. 
The above discussion suggests that under discriminatory tax rates, welfare of 
country 2 under a weak patent protection is maximized if firm 3 does not produce 
positive outputs. However, if  0
*
3 = I q  and all the outputs are sold in country 2, welfare 
of country 2 is not 
2 2
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4 Note that, given  0
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under discriminatory tax rates, if all the outputs are sold in country 2, welfare of 
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= π , which is equal to firm 
1’s profit under the strong patent protection. 
  The above discussion is summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2:  Consider a discriminatory tax policy in country 2. Whether the 
outputs are not sold in country 2 or they are sold entirely in country 2, the profit of 
firm 1 is the same under the weak and the strong patent protections in country 2. 
 
Proposition 2 suggests that the patent system in country 2 does not affect the 
profit of firm 1, thus in contrast to Pack and Saggi (2001). Since entry of firm 3 under 
weak patent protection imposes a cost c per-unit of output to country 2, under 
discriminatory tax system, country 2 charges the tax rates in a way so that firm 3 does 
not produce. Hence, in contrast to the case of uniform taxation, the tax rate faced by 
the firm producing positive output (which is firm 1) under discriminatory tax is the 
same under the weak and the strong patent protections in country 2. As a result, under 
discriminatory tax rate, the prices paid by firm 1 and its profit are the same under  
both weak and strong patent protections.  
 













> , the output of firm 3 remains zero but the output of firm 2 reduces   15
3. Conclusion 
An important suggestion of the WTO is to strengthen patent protection in the 
developing countries in order to provide proper returns to the developed-country 
firms from their innovations. We show that, in the case of a vertical technology 
transfer, if there is imperfect knowledge spillover, a strong patent protection in the 
developing country increases the profit of the developed-country firm if there is a 
uniform tax rate in the developing country. However, if there is either perfect 
knowledge spillover in the developing country or the developing country charges 
discriminatory tax rates, the profit of the developed-country firm is the same under 
the weak and the strong patent protections in the developing country. Thus, in 
contrast to the existing literature (Pack and Saggi, 2001), our result confirms the 
suggestion of WTO for extending patent protection in the developing countries in the 
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